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INTRODUCTION
Early in the twentieth century, the American Bar Association sought
to increase the requirements for admission to the bar, urged university
training in law, and revised its Canons of Ethics. Together those actions
acted to restrict access to the bar by immigrants; they also restricted the
availability of legal services to the poor. They were designed to increase
the status of the legal profession and to bring (or restore) order to the
profession. As American society became more industrial, the nature of
legal practice and legal questions was changing. The Canons of Ethics
reflect the broader goals of elite lawyers to channel and limit legal
change in order to reduce the threat of liability to industry and bring
stability and certainty to their profession.
Those regulations are important in themselves, for they tell us a
great deal about the relationship of the legal profession to politics in the
early part of the twentieth century. That tells only part of the story, how-
ever, for beneath the grand statements about the nature of legal practice,
made by the leaders of the elite bar, African American and women law-
t Professor of Law, University of Alabama. J.D., Columbia University; Ph.D., Harvard
University. 101 Bryant Drive, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, abrophy@law.ua.edu. I benefited
greatly from the comments of Mary Sarah Bilder, John Dzienkowski, and Robert Kuehn, and
from the advice of Carol Rice Andrews, Daniel Ernst, and Kenneth Mack.
I also owe special debts to Susan Carle, whose work has taught me much about ethics
regulation, and to Jerold Auerbach. His book Unequal Justice was one of the first I read when
I entered college; it directed my interest towards legal history, and now, nearly twenty years
later, I have had the pleasure of learning again from it.
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yers served a host of clients, whom historians have largely ignored. So,
as so often in American history, the bar has both a neatly stylized history
and a much messier version that is full of contradictions. As novelist
Ralph Ellison reminds us, there is a gap between the history as it is re-
corded and as it is actually lived. So while we might think that history is
neutral, that it records "the patterns of men's lives" and that "all things of
importance are recorded," the reality is quite different. "For actually it is
only the known, the seen, the heard and only those events that the re-
corder regards as important that are put down, those lies his keepers keep
their power by."' As Ellison said in a lecture at Brown University in
1979, "we possess two basic versions of American history: one which is
written and as neatly stylized as ancient myth, and the other unwritten
and as chaotic and full of contradictions, changes of pace and surprises
as life itself."' 2 This paper explores the two versions of the history of the
American Bar Association, both the ways that the elite bar acted to pre-
serve its image (and helped to maintain the profession as well) and how
others-lawyers and clients-helped to develop an alternative
jurisprudence.
I. THE 1908 CANONS AND THE NATURE OF THE
REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS
The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics (1908 Canons) comprised
the first comprehensive code; they governed the profession for decades.3
The Canons are the product of several streams of thought. They were
part of a larger movement of regulation in the Progressive era, the period
roughly between the turn of the twentieth century and World War I.
There was an increasing desire for status throughout the professions,
which led to efforts across the spectrum of physicians, lawyers, and ac-
countants to each differentiate themselves as a profession, and to estab-
lish professional standards. That in turn is related to Progressive-era
desires to stabilize the legal profession and regulate class structure. The
development of professional standards was one way that Progressive-era
reformers dealt with rapid social and political change. We think of the
Progressive era as one of vast regulation of business, including the devel-
I RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 439 (1952). See also Arthur G. LeFrancois, Our
Chosen Frequency: Norms, Race, and Transcendence in Ralph Ellison's Cadillac Flambe, 26
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1021 (2001) (discussing Ellison's theories of law, history, and
equality).
2 RALPH ELLISON, Going to the Territory, in GOING TO THE TERRITORY (Random House
1986), reprinted in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON 591, 594 (John F. Callahan
ed., 1995) [hereinafter ELLISON, COLLECTED ESSAYS].
3 Canons of Professional Ethics (1908), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 649-60 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2002) [hereinafter 1908
Canons] (setting forth Canons I to 32, which constituted the 1908 Canons).
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opment of the antitrust laws and federal agencies such as the Federal
Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration. Those regu-
lations served many important, pro-consumer functions, such as estab-
lishing minimum standards for health. They also served to bring stability
to the business environment. The 1908 Canons need to be viewed as part
of a larger ethos of regulation, which sought to raise professional stan-
dards, to bring stability to the profession, and to protect the public. The
Canons are part of the bar's desire to increase its status, and to control
lower economic classes and those who did not fit the definition of elite
classes. They are also part of a larger movement for regulation, such as
antitrust, which helped to stabilize business.
The Canons should be seen as part of much larger questions of his-
toriography: How do we evaluate the regulation of business in the Pro-
gressive era? And what was the nature of the complex relationship
between law, politics, government, and business? 4 There are a series of
historical traditions (i.e., "ages") that provide a framework for thinking
about regulation. During the Depression, historians wrote books about
the evils of the corporation, such as Charles and Mary Beards' history of
America. 5 Then, in the wake of the New Deal and America's triumph in
World War II, there was a re-emergence of confidence in government,
which led to such studies as Eric Goldman's Rendezvous with Destiny.6
The 1960s era of "small is beautiful" and anti-business suspicion of gov-
ernment brought forth Gabriel Kolko's The Triumph of Conservatism.7
Kolko argued that the dominant theme of regulation in the Progressive
era was protection of business. Government regulation served busi-
nesses' interests by stabilizing the business environment. 8
Commentators on the 1908 Canons have made similar interpreta-
tions. They have interpreted the 1908 Canons, and legal ethics more
generally, as designed to protect consumers and the integrity of the legal
profession by raising standards of entrance, protecting the quality of le-
gal services and protecting the integrity of the legal system. During the
Depression and New Deal eras, there were attempts to understand the
regulation of legal ethics as part of the protection of consumers and the
4 See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 2 (1990).
5 CHARLES AND MARY BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED States (1944).
6 ERIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN
REFORM (1956).
7 GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A RE-INTERPRETATION OF AMERI-
CAN HISTORY, 1900-1936 (1963).
8 See DAVID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE CAPITALISM (Oxford University Press 1979) (1977); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE COR-
PORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1928 (1967).
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legal profession itself.9 There was also concern that the legal profession
was dominated by business interests.' 0 The rise of social science led to
further understanding of the roles that self-interest plays in shaping deci-
sions about ethics.' I And in the post-World War II era, there was also a
growing understanding of the ABA's history of racial intolerance and its
elitist origins. 12
Louis Brandeis's 1913 speech at Harvard's Phillip Brooks House,
entitled The Opportunity in the Law, emphasized the danger threatening
the public interest because of lawyers' alignment with business. The
danger was particularly great because, as Theodore Roosevelt had said in
1905, at the start of the ABA's campaign for a code of professional eth-
ics, lawyers helped businesses avoid government regulation. In essence,
lawyers were assisting in lawbreaking.
Instead of holding a position of independence, between
the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the ex-
cesses of either, able lawyers have, to a large extent, al-
lowed themselves to become adjuncts of great
corporations and have neglected the obligation to use
their powers for the protection of the people. 13
There was a pernicious connection between talent and business in-
terests.' 4 Brandeis's professional ideal was of independent lawyers, who
9 Walter Burgwyn Jones, Canons of Professional Ethics, Their Genesis and History, 7
NOTRE DAME LAW 483, 494 (1932).
10 See, e.g., Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1934)
(expressing concern over connections between business interests and lawyers).
I I TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY PURE AND APPLIED 185 (1949). 1 am indebted to Russell Pearce whose work re-
minded me of Parsons' work, which had strayed from my memory. See Russel Pearce, Law-
yers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original
Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 386 n. 39
(2001).
12 See EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS
WORK (1953). More recently, law students have learned about the ABA's desire to prevent
lawyers from being influenced by "graft, greed and gain, or other unworthy motive." See, e.g.,
Report of the Committee on [the] Code of Professional Ethics, 1906 A.B.A. REP. 600, re-
printed in DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 113 (2d ed. 1995).
13 Louis D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 321
(Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (1914), reprinted in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 11, at 38.
14 Brandeis continued:
Such questions as the regulation of trusts, the fixing of railway rates, the municipal-
ization of public utilities, the relation between capital and labor, call for the exercise
of legal ability of the highest order. Up to the present time the legal ability of a high
order which has been expended on those questions has been almost wholly in oppo-
sition to the contentions of the people. The leaders of the Bar, without any precon-
ceived intent on their part, and rather as an incident to their professional standing,
have, with rare exceptions, been ranged on the side of the corporations, and the
people have been represented, in the main, by men of very meager legal ability.
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owed a duty to the common good, instead of a paramount duty to busi-
ness clients. His vision was not, however, the dominant one. 15 We con-
tinue to talk about these issues in terms of professional image' 6 and
protection of professional ethics, 17 as well as protection of clients and the
public. 18
The leading historical interpretation of the 1908 Canons is Jerold
Auerbach's account in his 1976 book, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and So-
cial Change in Modern America.'9 Auerbach's book explores a huge
theme: "the ominous gap between the services dispensed by the legal
profession and equal justice. '20 His laboratory for that exploration is the
legal profession in the first forty years of the twentieth century. He fo-
cuses particular attention on the ways elite lawyers tried to limit entrance
to the profession by regulating law schools and other legal training and
by regulating people already in the profession, which was done through
the 1908 Canons.
The raft to which American lawyers clung in the rapidly changing
society of the early twentieth century was the establishment of profes-
sional standards. Auerbach focuses on several standards in particular
which had a disproportionate effect on urban lawyers. These lawyers
had trouble establishing their practices and their clients. Their clients
were people of little means who might lose the chance to have a lawyer
without alternatives to the typical payment. The 1908 Canons made it
more difficult for urban lawyers to establish their practices and made it
more difficult for the clients to afford representation. Canon 10 prohib-
ited lawyers from "acquiring an interest in litigation"; Canon 28 re-
stricted "stirring up litigation"; and Canon 27 restricted advertising. 2'
15 See William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37
STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985). See also Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Bran-
deis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996).
16 Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229
(1995).
17 See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988)
(discussing the idea that lawyers are independent from clients and the functions that perception
serves); Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New Studies and New Paradigms
in Studies of the Legal Profession to LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMA-
TIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION I (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303
(1995).
18 AM. BAR Ass'N COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONALISM, "... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986); John
Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (1982); Simon,
supra note 15.
19 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976).
20 AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 13.
21 Id. at 42-43.
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Auerbach reserves particular contempt for Canon 13's restrictions on the
contingency fee, which he sees as necessary to provide a financial in-
ducement for lawyers to take the cases of poor clients, particularly the
victims of industrial accidents, who so frequently were left destitute. 22
Although the contingency fee was unquestionably legal, it was the
subject of much scorn. Auerbach sees criticism of the contingency fee as
central to the elite bar's hostility towards changes in the profession that
subjected corporations to increased liability. He interprets the contin-
gency fee as the road to legal access for poor tort victims, many of whom
were victims of industry.23 One of the proposed reforms of the contin-
gency fee was court supervision of contingency fee contracts. Auerbach
interprets such provisions as a one-sided attempt to limit their use rather
than protect clients. He observes that "insistence upon court supervision
of contingent fees to 'protect' clients from their lawyers was highly in-
congruous at a time when no other attorneys' fees were supervised and
when no principle was more tenaciously cherished by corporation law-
yers (and increasingly by the courts) than liberty of contract. ' 24 During
debate over the 1908 Canons, the bar relented and allowed the fees-
though it often made reference to the tendency of contingency fees to stir
up litigation, as well as the need for continuing court supervision of con-
tingency fee contracts. 25
Recently, other scholarship has tracked parts of Auerbach's inter-
pretation. 26 Susan Carle's article in Law and Social Inquiry, for exam-
22 Id. at 44-45.
23 Id. Contra Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanc-
tioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. Rev. 231 (1998).
Karsten's essay suggests an alternative vision of legal ethics and legal change from that of
Auerbach. Karsten's essay builds upon his previous work, which focuses on the humanity of
legal rules. Many legal historians have questioned the accuracy of his interpretation of the
legal ethics movement of the nineteenth century. See Alfred L. Brophy, Reason and Senti-
ment: The Moral Worlds and Modes of Reasoning of Antebellum Jurists, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1161
(1999) (reviewing PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1997)); Lawrence Friedman, Losing One's Head: Judges and the Law in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 253 (1999) (reviewing
PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
(1997)).
24 AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 47.
25 HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF
LEGAL ETHICS 169 (1925).
26 Most recently, Susan Carle has given a renewed focus in Susan D. Carle, Lawyers'
Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1
(1999). See also David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical Responsibilities: A
History, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 29, 36 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston
eds., 1986) (contrasting elite and ethnic bars); John A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar":
The Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 75 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter THE NEW HIGH
PRIESTS]; Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices
of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS, supra, at 51.
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pie, explores the troubled debate over whether the Canons should require
that lawyers "do justice" in civil cases. 27 Carle looks at this long-forgot-
ten debate and argues that a number of traditions clashed in the ultimate
undoing of the duty to "do justice." Her work seems generally in keep-
ing with Auerbach's finding that the 1908 Canons protected corporate
interests, which, in this case, was the right of lawyers to vigorously ad-
vance their agendas for their clients, independent of a duty to do absolute
justice.28 Similarly, Robert Gordon's work on the elite New York bar at
the turn of the twentieth century found that the most common path of
corporate law was a retreat from issues of legal science and law reform
to the service of their clients. 29 Russell Pearce has shifted attention to-
wards the ideological basis of the 1908 Canons, focusing on the imagery
of lawyers as independent professionals who owe a duty to the republic
generally. 30 Pearce's work, which focuses on idealists like George Shar-
swood, and figures more closely associated with business interests, has
attracted substantial attention. He has identified an important strain in
the public thought leading to the 1908 Canons, for he is certainly correct
that there were strong rhetorical appeals to ideas of "republicanism" in
discussions of ethics. It is enormously difficult, however, to connect
lawyers' public pronouncements of the virtues of their profession and
their lofty goals with the motivations behind the 1908 Canons. There has
frequently been a conflict between public aspirations for law and the
needs of clients. As was often said, "Law hath her seat in the bosom of
God; her voice is the harmony of the world."'31 But usually, when law-
yers were actually called upon to try their cases, they had to abandon
such lofty goals. As was aptly asked by the fictional antislavery lawyer
Edward Clayton in Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1856 novel Dred: A Tale of
27 Carle, supra note 26. See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
53-56 (1986).
28 There was a certain asymmetry in the bar's approach to vigorous advocacy. During
the Red Scare after World War I, the bar urged limitations on zealous representation of com-
munists. See Auerbach, supra note 19, at 102-05 (discussing ways that bar associations turned
representation of clients into lack of patriotism). Compare Canon 15, reprinted in Dzienkow-
ski, supra note 3, at 654 (revealing a limitation on zealous advocacy).
29 Gordon, supra note 26.
30 See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 241 (1992). Allison Marston has made a similar interpretation
of the 1887 Alabama code, locating its adoption in concern over professional standards and
control of the profession amid rapidly fluctuating economic times in post-Civil War Alabama.
See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State
Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471 (1998). See also Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as
America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of
the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTA3LE 381 (2001).
31 See Dred (quoting Richard Hooker). For a full exploration of Hooker's statement and
its implications for nineteenth-century lawyers, see Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Law-
yer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1997) (quoting Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity, in 1 WORKS OF RICHARD HOOKER 197, 285 (John Keble ed., 7th ed. 1888)).
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the Great Dismal Swamp, "Does not an advocate commit himself to one-
sided views of his subject and habitually ignore all truth on the other
side?" 32
Auerbach focuses on what he identifies as a conflict between corpo-
rate wealth and "justice. '33 There has, of course, always been a conflict
between law, property and wealth, and Americans' ideas of justice. Abo-
litionists, for instance, felt a conflict between legal doctrine supporting
slavery and notions of humanity. 34 Radical interpretations of law
throughout American history have focused on the gap between the pro-
gressive radicals; ideal of "justice," in the minds of progressive radicals,
and formal law. Frequently, radicals have criticized the common law for
its unfair results. The United States Magazine and Democratic Review
provided one such critique in 1841.
[The common law] has been extolled, by its admirers, as
the perfection of human reason; but to us it seems more
like a negation of reason. How it has so long retained its
ascendancy in the jurisprudence of civilized nations is,
we confess, an occasion of wonder. Nothing but the
grossest illusion on the part of its teachers, and the
grossest inertness on the part of the people, could have
enabled it to endure to so venerable an old age. Present
32 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, DRED: A TALE OF THE GREAT DISMAL SWAMP (1856).
Pearce has, nevertheless, opened up an important ground for exploration. Many antebellum
orators explored the duties of lawyers to the community-and celebrated their role in bringing
order to the community. See, e.g., DANIEL LORD, ON THE EXTRA-PROFESSIONAL INFLUENCE OF
THE PULPIT AND THE BAR, ORATION DELIVERED AT NEW HAVEN, BEFORE THE PHI BETA KAPPA
SOCIETY, OF YALE COLLEGE, AT THEIR ANNIVERSARY MEETING (JULY 30, 1851). Those ora-
tions can help recover the role that lawyers thought they might occupy in the community, as
well as the duties they believed they owed to the community. See Alfred L. Brophy, The Rule
of Law in Antebellum College Literary Addresses: The Case of William Greene, 31 CUMB. L.
REV. 231 (2001).
33 See AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 12-13. Auerbach seeks, with Ralph Ellison, to
infuse moral values into the legal arena. The Invisible Man asks "How the hell do you get
love into politics or compassion into history?" Ellison, supra note 2, at 274. I think Auerbach
wonders, "How do you get compassion into law?" That seems to be a question motivating the
other great works of legal history published nearly simultaneously with Unequal Justice. See
ROBERT M. Cover, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); MOR-
TON J. HOROWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
One might, however, contrast Auerbach's position with PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL
LAWYERS (1982). Though published just a few years after Auerbach, Irons finds lawyers he
thinks worthy of emulation. A comparison of Cover's antislavery judges and Irons' New Deal
lawyers might suggest some of the ways that legal thought changed from the mid-nineteenth to
the mid-twentieth century, or at least the ways that the law might be remade to service the
community.
34 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thought:
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Vision in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, 78 B.U. L. REV.
1113 (1998) (discussing Stowe's critique of slave law and her contrast between humanity and
slave law).
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it to an enlightened inhabitant of the Sandwich Islands,
could he be made to comprehend its scope and meaning,
and could he be instructed as to the social condition of
the nations where it is recognized, he would be struck
with astonishment, either at our stupidity or our slavish-
ness. He would point to its uncertainty, to its abstruse-
ness, to its inconsistencies, its fictions, its paltry details,
and its general want of justice, as things which barbari-
ans would hesitate to submit to, much less adopt, and of
which a civilized people should be ashamed. 35
II. RECONSIDERING THE 1908 CANONS: REGULATION OF
THE PROFESSION
Having discussed some historians' interpretations of the 1908 Ca-
nons, it is now possible to return to the 1908 Canons themselves and
revisit what they tell us about the nature of class and race in the legal
profession. The key elements of the 1908 Canons that limited the poor's
access to the bar and to becoming lawyers are contingency fee contracts
and the re-definition of professional ethics to prevent solicitation of cli-
ents and the stirring of litigation. A review of the ABA's debates over
the writing of the 1908 Canons suggests the multiple strands that created
them. ABA President Henry St. George Tucker, whose ancestors had
been lawyers as far back as the early republic, 36 closed his 1905 Presi-
dential Address with reference to President Theodore Roosevelt's ad-
dress to Harvard alumni on the evils of lawyers' subservience to business
interests and the ways that legal talent was perverted to evade regulation:
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with
cynical contempt for those prohibitions of the law which
by hired cunning he can escape or evade is a menace to
our country, and the county is not to be excused if it
does not develop a spirit which actively frowns on and
discountenances him. The great profession of the law
should be that whose members ought to take the lead in
the creation of just such a spirit. We all know that, as
things actually are, many of the most influential and
35 Edward Livingston and His Code, 9 U.S. MAG. & DEMO. REV. 211, 211-12 (1841).
36 The Tucker family is worthy of biography. Their shifting political positions illustrate
both the changes in American attitudes and in the bar-and the family's desire to be at the
forefront of the profession. One might begin the story with St. George Tucker, author of an
American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, (Philadelphia, 1803) which urged the gradual
abolition of slavery, and continue on to proslavery writers and college professors Henry St.
George Tucker and Nathan Beverly Tucker, and further continuing on to ABA president Henry
St. George Tucker. But that is a story for another time.
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most highly remunerated members of the Bar in every
center of wealth make it their special task to work out
bold and ingenious schemes by which their very wealthy
clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws
which are made to regulate in the interest of the public
the use of great wealth. 37
Such demonstrations of wealth purchasing exemptions from regula-
tion brought law into contempt. 38 Tucker subtly converted Roosevelt's
concern over business' capture of lawyers to a concern (mostly) over
honesty. 39 The need for honesty was intimately connected with the sta-
tus of the profession, for "if our profession is to receive the reward which
is its just due, and is to accomplish the high aim for which it is destined,"
dishonest lawyers must be prosecuted.40 Subsequent action by the ABA
moved even further from Roosevelt's concern to concerns about the in-
tegrity of the profession. It moved toward emphasizing the image of the
profession, rather than the regulation of business' misuse of lawyers. 41
There were, in fact, multiple strands that came together to create the
Canons. One strand was the desire to protect the public; a second was a
desire to raise the status of the legal profession; and a third was a desire
to maintain the elite bar's status and integrity. The debates of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in the years leading into the canons illustrate all
those concerns, especially the concern with protecting (and increasing)
the profession's image. Lawyers frequently told themselves that they
were part of a sacred profession. They spared little effort in self-congrat-
ulation. Henry St. George Tucker was particularly strong in his presi-
dential address to the ABA:
My closing appeal to the representatives of the American
Bar Association, who stand forth clothed in priestly
robes, as ministers at the altar of justice, is for the vindi-
cation of the claim that the profession of the law is the
most ennobling and powerful for good of all the secular
professions. With our loins girded and our lamps burn-
ing, our Association by keeping alive the fires of profes-
37 Henry St. George Tucker, Address of the President, in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-
EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N 299, 383 (1905) [hereinafter 1905 ABA
REPORT] quoting Theodore Roosevelt. Before the Harvard Alumni at Cambridge (1904 or 05).
38 See id.
39 See id. at 387 ("I dare venture to assert that the real need of America today in the
transaction of private business and in the moulding of a lofty, public sentiment is the high-
toned, honorable, conscientious lawyer.").
40 Id. at 387.
41 Susan Carle has provided a detailed history of how the ABA decided against finding a
duty to do justice as part of its 1908 canons. See Carle, supra note 26. That decision was
critical in departing from Roosevelt's plan.
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sional purity upon her altars may, in working out her
future destiny, add to her proud achievements in the his-
tory of our beloved country still richer trophies in the
progress of our noble profession.42
To preserve its image, the bar had to limit the appearance of materi-
alism. Lucien Hugh Alexander emphasized the need to limit the appear-
ance of money in solicitation of clients. "Our profession is the keystone
of the republican arch of government. . . . Weaken this keystone by
allowing it to be increasingly subject to the corroding and demoralizing
influence of those who are controlled by graft, greed and gain or other
unworthy motives, and sooner or later the arch must fall."'43
The ABA was aware of the impact its proposed regulations, raising
the educational standards for admission to the bar, had on who might
enter the profession. Some members did not care. Lawrence Maxwell,
chair of the ABA's legal education section, boldly dismissed considera-
tion of the impact on the chances of poor men to enter the legal
profession:
Are we to have one standard for poor men and another
standard for rich men? . . . The state is not concerned
with the fortune of the individual when it comes into
conflict with the general good. The inquiry should be
confined to the capacity of the applicant to serve the
state. Law is not administered as private philanthropy,
but as the supreme interest of the state. The office of a
lawyer is not a private business, but a public trust. 44
Maxwell justified the proposal that law schools require a college
education for entrance on the basis that colleges developed a moral sensi-
bility among their students, which would lead to a moral tone in the legal
profession.45 Maxwell had a thinly disguised contempt for those of mod-
42 Tucker, supra note 37, at 389.
43 Lucien Hugh Alexander, Some Admission Requirements Considered Apart from Edu-
cational Standards, in 1905 ABA REPORT, supra note 37, at 619, 620.
44 Lawrence Maxwell, Chairman's Address, in 1905 ABA REPORT, supra note 33, at
582, 591 (1905). Professor Maxwell continued:
[T]he plea for the poor young man, while made in his name, is not made on his
behalf or in his true interest. He does not wish to be handicapped in the race, and of
all others can least afford to be, by inadequate preparation. Ordinarily, he is not. He
asks no favors. If he has the right stuff in him, he finds ways and means to secure
the proper education.
It is also said this if higher standards of general education are required it will
tend to make the profession a place for the sons of rich men only .... The law is the
last vocation in the world to attract a rich man. It is too laborious and wearing. If I
were rich, I think I should look for an easier job.
Id. at 591-92.
45 Id. at 590. Maxwell subtly linked education and exclusion with moral sensibility:
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est backgrounds who attended evening law schools. 46 Similarly, Phila-
delphia lawyer Lucien Hugh Alexander said, while discussing the
Massachusetts practice of allowing applicants to sit for the bar who had
not completed a course of study at an approved law school, "[i]t is easy
to comprehend how this system has unwittingly grown up in certain por-
tions of America permeated with the spirit of freedom ever striving to
accord equal rights to all and special privileges to none."'47 It is easy to
extrapolate from such statements that the advocacy of higher standards
for admission were related to shoring up the walls around the legal pro-
fession, to limiting the rights of entry. For in a world where the profes-
sion's status was in flux, it could secure its status by excluding others.
There were some defenders of the contingency fee. T.J. Walsh of
Montana thought them particularly important in balancing out the power
distribution between workers injured by industrial accident and their em-
ployers. 48 For Walsh, lawyers who took contingency fees, and thus ena-
I do not refer to the stealing of money, the subordination of witnesses, the forgery of
records or other penitentiary forms of misconduct, but to the moral sensibility which
does not stir up litigation, or defend against clear claims without justification, or give
pernicious advice knowingly, or assist in illegal transactions, or abuse the confidence
of the courts; in other words, to the quality which we summarize when we refer to a
lawyer as an honorable practitioner.
Id.
46 Id. at 593.
The large increase in the number of law schools during the past twenty-five years
has not been wholly in the interest of the public or for the good of the cause....
Some of them are so far below anything approximating a standard as to justify us in
calling them bogus schools. They are a public evil .... More often they are organ-
ized for the money that can be made through the fees ... of clerks, officeholders,
real estate brokers and detectives to whom they hold out, in true quack style, the
prospect of attaining positions of eminence at the Bar or in politics if they devote a
few hours in the evening to the so-called study of law.
Id.
47 Lucien Hugh Alexander, supra note 43, at 635. Alexander feared that law would lose
its claim as status as profession that required devoted study. Otherwise, "admission to the Bar
will become a tail to some business kite, an advertisement wherewith to draw business to real
estate, insurance, notarial or other office." Id. at 644.
Alexander believed those standards guarded against commercialism:
Let us not wait until the profession is riddled and honeycombed with men fresh from
the marts of trade, bringing with them ideals foreign to those of the law, but let us,
ere it is too late, forever bar the portals to our professions against those who have not
been trained in the environment of the law, and without which they can never catch
its soul and spirit.
Id. at 644.
48 See Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N (1908) [hereinafter
1908 ABA REPORT]:
The enormous increase in the use of machinery and mechanical appliances in recent
years has caused the rapid multiplication of the number of actions of this character.
To the credit of those who have devoted themselves more or less to this line of
professional work, it may be said that their success in compelling satisfaction in
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bled the poor to have access to courts, were more ethical than those who
only took cases for which they were guaranteed a fee.49 Walsh decoded
the arguments of those who thought contingency fees stirred litigation
and led to baseless suits. There were many suits that were meritorious
and that would never have been heard without the contingency fee.50 It
was, quite simply, a matter of the poor against corporations. Walsh did
not want clients to wait upon gratuitous offers from busy lawyers to take
their case for a fee. 51 Another member of the committee, Edward B.
Whitney of New York, also recognized the class-based nature of opposi-
tion to the fee: "The contingent fee is much the fairest to a poor client. I
have noticed that the majority of its opponents have always been those
whose clients are rich enough to pay whether they win or lose. Vast
injustice would go unredressed if it were not for the contingent fee."'52
Or, as the New York Bar Association report said, "It may be summarized
in one statement: the poor man's fee."'53
Yet the majority continued to see the contingency fee, as well as
advertising and attempts to stir litigation, as harmful to the image of the
profession. One member of the canons committee summarized the need
to eliminate greed in the profession:
Men are admitted to the bar and are tempted and yield to
temptation. They become, for example, what are called,
for convenience, 'shysters,' 'calaboose lawyers' and
'ambulance chasers.' They promote suits for personal
these cases has been such that it is now rare that one injured or deprived by death of
a relative, from whom support was due, under circumstances creating a liability,
does not take counsel as to his right to recover.
49 Id.
.. I am ready to contend that the lawyer who places his services at the disposal of
those who have not a dollar to pay for them save out of the fruits of his labors,
deserves better of the profession and of the public than he who refuses to prosecute
save for those able to pay, whatever the outcome of the litigation.
50 See id. at 65-66.
51 Id. at 67.
It is altogether quixotic to imagine that members of the Bar of high standing are
going to come forward to offer gratuitously to prosecute such claims, even though
their oath of office might seem to enjoin such a course. The ordinary person would
be restrained by the most commendable considerations of delicacy from even sug-
gesting to a busy lawyer that his duty enjoined such conduct or from intimating in
the most delicate way that he would be pleased to have it observed.
52 AM. BAR ASS'N, MEMORANDUM FOR USE OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S COMMIT-
TEE To DRAFT CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). This is the report referred to by in
the Canon Drafting Committee's final report as the "Red Book." For the sake of clarity in
citation, I have listed the ABA as the author; sometime it is referred to as edited by Lucien
Hugh Alexander.
53 Id. at 73.
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injuries and promote them in such a way as to lead to
scandal and perjury of the worst kind.54
Contemporaneous with the 1908 Canons, there was substantial writ-
ing that equated the canons, and legal profession more generally, with
preservation of established interests. Julius Henry Cohen's 1916 book,
The Law: Business or Profession, explored the connections between the
bar and business interests. 55 Other works, even from those inside the
legal profession, emphasized inequality in the distribution of justice.
Reginald Huber Smith's 1919 study, Justice and the Poor, for instance,
cataloged the defects in the legal system, such as delay, court costs, and
lawyers' fees, that led to a chasm between the ideal of "freedom and
equality of justice" and the fact of "denial of justice. '56 Smith's study,
financed by the Carnegie Foundation, aimed to promote legal aid socie-
ties. Smith aimed at the promotion of equal access to justice, which he
argued was part of lawyers' moral and legal duty.57 He also believed
that legal aid societies might raise the reputation of lawyers and respect
for law, which poor people viewed with disdain.58 Others justified equal
access on similar utilitarian grounds: that it assured democracy. Henry
S. Pritchett, president of the Carnegie Foundation, wrote: "The very exis-
tence of free government depends upon making the machinery of justice
so effective that the citizens of the democracy shall believe in its imparti-
ality and fairness." 59 Justice and the Poor left untouched the question of
whether justice was denied in part because of unjust rules from the out-
set, such as the freedom of contract, which refused to recognize the in-
herent imbalance in power between workers and employers.
54 Id. at 43.
55 See also JULIUS HENRY COHEN, LAW AND ORDER IN INDUSTRY: FIVE YEARS' EXPERI-
ENCE (1916).
56 REGINALD HU1ER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL
OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION
BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES
(1919).
57 Id. at 229.
The last and greatest service which the legal aid organizations render is that in all
their work they are relieving the bar of a heavy burden by performing for the bar its
legal and ethical obligation to see that no one shall suffer injustice through inability,
because of poverty, to obtain needed legal advice and assistance.
Id.
58 Huber believed that the "legal aid societies strive to teach their clients not only that the
law is fair, but that lawyers are not without honor and conscience." Id. at 229. The societies
were swimming against a tide of opinion taught by "at least that part born in the lower social
stratus," that "lawyers are a class who prey on the weak, who profit out of their misery, and
who are so strongly entrenched that the state cannot curb them." Those attitudes, "taught from
infancy" to the current generation was based on "intelligent criticism founded on facts."
Those facts contributing to this opinion include "the contingency fee, the commercialization of
the profession, and the lowering of standards!" Id. at 228.
59 Id. at xiv.
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Other evidence suggests the legal profession saw standards as a way
of differentiating itself. The very first question in Henry Jessup's 1925
book, The Professional Ideals of the Lawyer: A Study of Legal Ethics,
was "what is a profession"? His answer included the "subordination of
pecuniary returns to efficient service." 60 Or, as Simeon Baldwin said in
1903, "Honor is the real touchstone for a lawyer's conduct.... This may
make it improper to seek what it would be proper to accept unsought....
The ambulance-chaser does nothing dishonest, but none the less he dis-
honors the profession."'61 It was the grimy search for money that seemed
to concern Jessup the most. For instance, Jessup warned against solicita-
tion of clients, because that was not "decent, nor consistent with the es-
sential dignity of the profession." The profit motive was at the base of
what was undignified.62 The New York County Lawyers' Association
confronted a question about the ethics of a lawyer maintaining a financial
interest in a company that investigated public service corporations' rates,
when that company then funneled cases to the lawyer. The Committee
concluded that such a company was "a device for systematically ob-
taining business for a lawyer, and for stirring up litigation for profit,"
which was improper.63
The debate over the 1908 Canons and the debate over their adoption
illustrate the legal profession in a state of flux. Although the Canons,
ostensibly, were concerned with maintaining the integrity of the profes-
sion, their effect was to limit the law as a means of social change or of
redistribution of power. They were, as one would expect of from the
60 HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF
LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1925). Jessup cites The Ethics of the Professions and of Business, 101
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. (1922).
61 THOMAS H. HUBBARD & SIMEON EBEN BALDWIN, LEGAL ETHICS: LECTURES DELIV-
ERED BEFORE THE STUDENTS OF THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF UNION UNIVERSITY, quoted in
JESSUP, supra note 60, at 4. See also Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal
Ethics, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 541 (1908).
62 JESSUP, supra note 60, at 35 ("To avail oneself of indecent methods of soliciting busi-
ness per se or per alium for pecuniary or other payment, is to lay up memories fatal to future
self-respect."). Dignity was often tarnished by public displays in the pursuit of money. Jes-
sup's interpretation of the rules of advertising produced the perverse result, however, that
small town lawyers might advertise while those in larger cities could not. Because small town
lawyers were known in their community, they might "carry a card" in the local newspaper, if
they operated within the "limits of taste and decency implicit" in Canon 27 ("Advertising,
Direct or Indirect"). Id. at 32. However, lawyers in cities could not advertise. Id. ("For a
lawyer in a great city, unknown to the community, to publish the same card in a daily paper, or
placard it in a subway car or bus, would be undignified apart from the ridicule and contempt it
would excite.").
63 JESSUP, supra note 60, at 168. Similarly, contingency fees had the "tendency to breed
the twin evils of solicitation of employment and improper division of fees. It develops both in
the lay and in the professional mind a conception of the practice of law as a business, not a
profession, and tends to lower the essential standards of the Bar." Id. at 169.
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legal profession, conservative. 64 But even the conservative elements of
the Canons illustrate the limits of elite control over the bar. For beneath
the grand statements of the ABA, there flowed a whole host of lawyers,
who illustrate the deep divide about the nature and purpose of American
law. Just as there were dominant trends of subordinating interests of
"justice" to corporate power, there were many instances in which that
model, if confronted, was overcome. Law was also becoming a means
for social change.
III. THE REDEFINITION OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: THE
CASE OF THE NAACP
With that background, we can turn to Susan Carle's discussion of
the role of the NAACP's litigation experience in illuminating legal eth-
ics. Carle's work explores the relationship between ethics, class, and
race and casts light on significant changes in twentieth century legal
thought.65 She starts with the anomaly that much of the NAACP's early
litigation appears to violate rules of ethics: they solicited clients and
manufactured cases to test discriminatory laws. Yet the same people
who violated those rules were leaders of the elite bar, who were closely
allied with the very people who had formulated those rules. So we are
left with the question: how do we explain that apparent conflict? How
could the NAACP's board members be both closely allied with the lead-
ers of the bar and apparently be acting inconsistently with their ethical
rules? Carle is not merely a historian, however, who identifies intriguing
anomalies in the minds of long-dead actors. She is also an advocate for
reform of contemporary legal ethics. So she wants to use the NAACP as
a laboratory for understanding how legal ethics change? And why? 66
Carle's work revolves around the question of how we should ana-
lyze lawyers' class interests in the development of legal ethics rules. In
brief, did class interests dominate the formulation (or modification) of
64 It is inappropriate to view the Canons as one-dimensional. In permitting contingency
fee contracts, for instance, they illustrate progressive concerns even within the elite's bar.
65 See Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP (Part II),
8 U. CI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 282 (2002).
That transition reflects one aspect of an enormously complicated story that has pre-
occupied legal historians for many years-namely, accounting for the fundamental
transformations in American jurisprudence and legal practice that occurred during
the first several decades of the twentieth century. That story includes the shift from
lawyers and judges' adherence to the a priori, individualistic approach of late nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence to the consequentialism and group orientation of socio-
logical jurisprudence and legal realism, changing approaches to procedural and
jurisdictional bars to class actions and other nontraditional forms of litigation, and
the replacement of notions of a consensual 'public interest' with ideas of interest
group pluralism.
66 See Susan Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20
L. & HIST. REV. 97 (2002); Susan Carle, supra note 65, at 281.
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rules regarding solicitation of clients and manufacturing of lawsuits, or
were there other interests at stake in the formation of those rules? To
figure out the apparent anomaly is difficult. Carle conducts an intensive
study to get to key divisions between class and race in the formulation
and execution of legal ethics.
Carle's first and perhaps most important finding is that NAACP
lawyers were engaged in a creative, lawyer-like process of redefining the
boundaries of acceptable behavior under the Canons. They interpreted
their behavior as different from the (disdainful) behavior of others, who
created lawsuits and solicited clients. They created a new category of
public interest law. Yet it is questionable whether it is so surprising that
the elite lawyers think that the NAACP was exempt from the ethics rules.
Was not the NAACP doing something different from soliciting clients
for profit and stirring litigation for their own economic benefit? That is
difficult to determine. Carle points to an advisory opinion written by the
American Bar Association, which said that it was improper to solicit
members of the Armed Services to offer them assistance in receiving
back pay, and another that stated that lawyers employed by an automo-
bile club could not speak at the club's meeting to organize or raise
money to challenge a new state law that would adversely affect the
client.67
David Wilkins asked a similar, though somewhat bolder question:
legal elites simply did not feel constrained by the legal ethics rules. 68
Those elites may not have had much in the way of thinking about legal
ethics other than that those rules did not apply to them. There might be
two reasons why those rules did not apply. First, the legal elites were not
constrained by any rules. That is Wilkins' point. This is an extremely
difficult issue to determine with any precision. It involves getting into
the motives of legal elites and sifting through documents and conversa-
tions to which scholars simply are not privy at this point.69
67 Carle, supra note 66, at 137.
68 David Wilkins, Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange
Bedfellows, 20 L. & HIST. REv. 147-51 (2002). One wonders whether the ethics opinions to
which Carle refers, Care, supra note 66, at 137, demonstrate that the bar refused to recognize
the category of public interest litigation, or whether it might support Wilkins' point that the
elite's bar believed it could act in whatever way it wanted. The data fit both interpretations.
69 Wilkins's point is derived in large part from Jerold Auerbach's work. See Wilkins,
supra note 68, at 148 (citing Auerbach). It makes sense to argue from such data that rules that
restrict non-elite lawyers from making money might not be applied with equal force to elite
lawyers. This is the bold form of Wilkins's point (what Carle calls the economic determinist
argument). Still, as I indicated in sections I and It, the regulations served a purpose beyond
exclusion of racial minorities and women. Given those alternative purposes, it is hard to sus-
tain the bold argument that this is another in a series of cases where elite lawyers simply
believe the ethics rules do not apply to them. Id. at 148. ("I cannot help thinking about a
simpler ... explanation for the paradox Carle describes: with few exceptions, elite lawyers
never believe that the restrictions in the ethics codes apply to them.").
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A less conspiratorial rationale may be that the NAACP lawyers saw
what they were doing as public interest work, which is different from
soliciting clients for money and stirring up litigation. Might there not be
a more middle path? Beginning from the Wilkins-Auerbach position that
elite lawyers were trying to restrict non-elite lawyers from misbehaving
and soliciting clients for money? We can say that when lawyers do not
solicit for money, they do not run afoul of the Canons. Perhaps some of
the lessons of the NAACP's experience with the Canons are that even
conservative lawyers can remake their understanding of ethics and that
they can, in appropriate cases, draw distinctions between public interest
litigation and the greedy drumming up of cases. If that is the case, it also
suggests that there may be some content to lawyers' self-image as pro-
tectors of justice. One should not tell too optimistic a story, of course,
because it was not long before legal ethics rules were used as a club
against the NAACP's litigation efforts.
IV. AFRICAN AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THE RE-MAKING
OF THE PROFESSION
Still, if one is looking for an understanding of the interplay of race
and class on legal change, there are many more people who must be
brought into the picture. The focus on white lawyers in the NAACP,
while very important, ignores a critically important, grass-roots process
of civil rights litigation that took place at the same time or earlier than
what the white lawyers were doing. There were others, outside the main-
stream, who were just as important, perhaps even more important, in the
cause of civil rights litigation, who stirred litigation.
Some of my favorite stories come from African American lawyers,
such as J.B. Stradford. He took a train from Kansas to Oklahoma (and
thus was in interstate transit) for the express purpose of challenging
Oklahoma's railroad segregation statute. He was forcibly removed from
the first class car when the train crossed into Oklahoma and then arrested
at the train's next stop. The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied his request
for relief, citing a United States Circuit Court opinion that maintained
there was no denial of equal protection because there were not enough
African Americans traveling in luxury accommodations to make them
economically feasible.70 The same statute was successfully challenged
in the United States Supreme Court by Edward McCabe. McCabe was
not as bold as Stratford; he had failed to physically challenge the law, so
McCabe-who was assisted by NAACP lawyers-was denied relief!7'
70 Stratford [sic] v. Midland Valley R. Co., 128 P. 98 (Okla. 1912).
71 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 162-63 (1914).
See also Carle, supra note 26, at 123 (discussing McCabe).
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Another telling story is that of Roscoe Dunjee. He was a newspaper
man from Oklahoma City and was on the board of the NAACP in the
1930s. His editorials in the Oklahoma City Black Dispatch from the
1910s until his death in the early 1960s articulate an alternative vision for
law. Dunjee helped demonstrated that the world might be ordered differ-
ently from the way it was, and gave his readers the knowledge and cour-
age to act to remake their world. One finds in his editorials the substance
of what Ralph Ellison called in Invisible Man the "Great Constitutional
Dream Book."'72 Those of us who want to experience that book can do
so by reading Dunjee's editorials. Dunjee is given credit for beginning
Sipuel v. Oklahoma, which integrated the University of Oklahoma Law
School. 7 3 Such decisions are generated by outsiders and by African
Americans.
Focusing on the elite lawyers can warp our sense of their impor-
tance. If we look for the contributions of elites, we can find them, but we
do not see the complete picture, which includes how others contributed
to social change (or how other elites restrained legal change). It also
causes us to misunderstand how the arrows of influence worked. If the
elites are taking lessons from the people in the remote provinces, then
that in itself tells us something about the nature of class and social
change. The NAACP provided excellent legal help, but it is the people
in places like Elaine County, Arkansas who were responsible for starting
the changes. 74 The ideas of social change arose often from people
outside the mainstream-and we need to talk about those, rather than
focusing on legal elites. A process of focusing on legal mandarins may
expand their contribution out of proportion to what they actually contrib-
uted to legal change. Kenneth Mack has recently demonstrated that pro-
cess in stunning detail through Sadie T.M. Alexander, an important
African American lawyer in the early and middle part of the twentieth
century.75 It is becoming increasingly possible to talk about elements of
elite power structures, like the courts, as the vehicles for the advance of
72 ELLISON, supra note 1, at 280. See also Ralph Ellison, Roscue Dunjee and the Ameri-
can Language, A Talk to the Black Perspective Conference in New York City (May 14, 1972),
in ELLISON, COLLECTED ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 458-59 ("The whole concept of changing
segregation through appeals to the Supreme Court was present in Oklahoma City when I was a
boy, and was propagated through the columns of a weekly newspaper.").
73 Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 61-63 (1994);.
74 GRIF STOCKLEY, BLOOD IN THEIR EYES: THE ELAINE RACE MASSACRES OF 1919
(2001); Carle, Buchanan to Button, supra note 65, at 289-92 (discussing Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923), which arose out of the Arkansas prosecutions).
75 See Kenneth Walter Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie T.M. Alexan-
der and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal Profession, 1925-1960,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405 (2002). Mack's work demonstrates the importance of looking
outside of elite structures to see how lawyers functioned and developed a professional identity
and served clients. He demonstrates the rich history of the legal profession and makes us
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understand that important events took place outside of the American Bar Association meetings
and the halls of elite law firms.
Others have been arguing that point for years; legal academics have just failed to pay much
attention to them, perhaps because the people arguing this point were outside of the elite
power structure. For example, B.C. Franklin tells us in his autobiography about the ways that
African American lawyers represented their clients in court in Oklahoma in the 1920s and
1930s. Indeed, one is led to conclude from Franklin's story that courts were important sites of
public integration during the era of Jim Crow. See BUCK COLBERT FRANKLIN, My LIFE AND
AN ERA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BUCK COLBERT FRANKLIN 192-218 (John Hope Franklin &
John Whittington Franklin eds., 1997). Lawyers like Franklin sought justice through the
courts, even though sometimes judges contorted the law to arrive at results that now seem
patently unfair. Still, Franklin modeled how lawyers should behave. One thinks of his lawsuit
against the Tulsa World, which had-in a laughably racist story-placed the phrase, "nigger"
in Franklin's mouth. Franklin sued the World, claiming that the story was defamatory because
his clients would not like him using the word. As he phrased it, "the word 'nigger' is detesta-
ble to the members of the negro race, and the use of the word in public as ascribed to have
been used by the plaintiff, held him up to scorn, hatred, ridicule, and contempt of the members
of the negro race, and tended to deprive him of the public confidence, resulting in substantial
injury to him as a lawyer." Franklin v. World Publishing Co., 83 P.2d 401 (Okla. 1938).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the misattribution was not defamatory:
The acts and words attributed to the plaintiff in his defense of his clients are such as
are commonly used by the more illiterate Southern Negro. The word "nigger," com-
plained of, has been brought forward from the days of negro slavery and is today
frequently used by both the white man and the negro in a friendly way without
reflection or ill feeling. This practice, while not universal, is very common in the
Southern state. At most, it is but an abbreviated or substituted form for the word
"negro," and we are unable to see how the use of the word as generally used when
referring to the negro casts any insult or reflection whatsoever. Many books have
been written portraying the acts, habits, and language of the negro and written in
negro dialect. These books are found in the public libraries of both races and are read
with interest and appreciation.
Id.
The reader may judge for herself whether that explanation is convincing. While it is possible,
though doubtful, that the N-word for a time in the 1930s was used "in a friendly way without
reflection or ill feeling," in the 1920s the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals overturned a
conviction when the N-word was used to refer to a defendant. See Hamilton v. State, 259 P.
168, 171 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1927) (overturning conviction for homicide when district attor-
ney repeatedly referred to defendant as "nigger" and noting that "[aIll persons accused of
crime, whatever their race, color, or condition, should stand on exactly the same footing in a
court of justice .... Particularly is this true where a negro charged with an offense against a
white man is tried before a white court and an exclusively white jury, and where the death
sentence, the extreme penalty known to the law, may be imposed."). See also RANDALL KEN-
NEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD 56-112 (2002) (discussing
shifting meanings of the word as used by judges, prosecutors, and jurors). The Black Dispatch
recognized the powerful appeal such a term contained. See Ballots Are Bullets! Shoot Early on
Tuesday, BLACK DISPATCH I (October 29, 1920).
In their frantic efforts to yank back into line the disgruntled Gore Democrats ... the
Democratic State Committee of Oklahoma has thrown out a horde of howling mon-
grels, who like the buzzards that they are, are roosting in every nook and corner of
the state this week, with their leather lungs are shouting the old battle cry of
'Nigger'.
Id. I am indebted to James Hirsch, who alerted me to Franklin's case.
In the aftermath of the Tulsa race riot, for instance, African Americans testified in court
about the riot and employed lawyers in a valiant-but fruitless-effort to receive compensa-
tion from their insurance companies and the city. See Alfred L. Brophy, The Tulsa Race Riot
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pluralism. So while Auerbach's story from the 1970s was anti-lawyer
(and particularly anti-elite lawyer), the story that scholars are telling of
the early part of the twenty-first century is of the ways that the legal
system was re-made to accommodate the needs of non-elites.
76
Moreover, to the extent we focus on the elite lawyers, we need to
realize that the NAACP lawyers were but a sub-set of the elite bar. The
fact that some people, like Storey and Boston, were engaged in making
the Canons does not mean that their views represented that of the entire
elite bar. So we need to be careful in extrapolating from the ideas of the
elites to take cognizance of the NAACP board and the rest of the elite
bar. Perhaps the rest of the elite bar did not approve of the NAACP's
actions-and, of course, a significant percentage did not. Hence the liti-
gation that led to the decision in Button.77
Here is a proposed version of the story behind the Cannons to which
this essay has led. The Canons were designed to protect class interests
and stabilize a profession in flux. This was done by the profession with
some sense of what they were accomplishing. The ideology motivating
these actions was both a commitment to modest equal protection and the
development of the legal profession. We can consider the movement
towards canons as part of the progress of the legal profession towards
self-regulation, higher standards of professionalism, and the exclusion of
certain elements of the bar.78 The redefinition of the NAACP's activities
of 1921 in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 67 (2001) (discussing riot litiga-
tion and the testimony of African Americans and whites in the Tulsa court regarding the riot).
The riot litigation provides an important site for viewing the conflicting interpretations of
whites and African Americans and as a way of resolving-even if through biased rules-the
conflicting interpretations of the riot. What is perhaps heartening, if anything can be from the
riot, is that the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the culpability of the white commu-
nity in the destruction of the Greenwood community. Though these stories-and the insights
one can draw from riots-are stories for another time. See Gretchen Sween, Rituals, Riots,
Rules, and Rights: The Astor Place Theater Riot of 1849 and the Evolving Limits of Free
Speech, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 679 (2002).
76 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND
IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 1 (2002) (arguing that "the law of New York-law
proclaimed largely by state court judges rather than by legislators or federal officials-has
been the principle instrument facilitating" the "attempt of ... [people] of all colors, skins,
faiths, and tongues to live together in a community"). It is, perhaps, significant, that Lawrence
Friedman's American Law in the Twentieth Century, published the same year as Nelson's
Legalism Reformation, had a similar theme. Already the assessments of Friedman's book are
focusing on the ways that America was a creatively harmonized America, how law accommo-
dated (maybe even led to) pluralism. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Creative Uncertainty, 81
TEXAS L. REV. 627 (2002) (reviewing Friedman); Alfred L. Brophy, Law as a Character of
Society: Legal Change in Twentieth-Century America, 30 REV. AM. HIST. 631, 637-38 (2002)
(expressing some skepticism about Friedman's story).
77 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
78 One thinks of Roscoe Pound's definition of a profession. See RoscoE POUND, THE
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 9-10 (1953), quoted in John Dzienkowski, The
Regulation of the American Legal Profession and Its Reform, 68 TEX. L. REV. 451 (1989)
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as outside of the Canons tells us about the how the bar defined itself and
others.
More specifically, if we're thinking about the role of class on civil
rights, if we are trying to divine the causes of the shifts in jurisprudence
from the individualism of the nineteenth century to legal realism, we can
sometimes measure those changes by looking at legal ethics. But I think
we want to focus most of our attention on legal doctrine. How did legal
elites (mostly judges in this case) formulate rules that assisted the devel-
opment of civil rights-or, perhaps more importantly, how did they hin-
der them?
And on the large critical issues, like how did class interests inter-
sected and conflicted with race in driving social change, we need to con-
sider places where we can test the influence that class interests have on
racial equality. Elite corporate lawyers might very well have wanted to
encourage equal treatment for African Americans because that it fits with
their ideas about individualism. This was a time when the Republican
Party is generally more supportive of civil rights for African Americans
than was the Democratic Party.79 The Republican-dominated corporate
bar had an ideology at the time of freedom of contract and equal protec-
tion principles that support limited rights for African Americans.
Let me conclude with an example from the World War I era race
riots: the first terrible riot in East St. Louis. It began in an atmosphere of
racial and class conflict, as poor whites began to fear and resent non-
unionized African American workers who were taking low-wage jobs in
meat packing plants and factories. Here you have a classic case of busi-
ness benefiting from granting rights to African American workers. It
brings into relief some reasons why elite corporate interests might protect
certain equal protection rights of African Americans. And it is through
episodes like that in East St. Louis that we can see all of these factors
coming together. 80
(identifying "spirit of public service," "pursuit of a learned art," and organization as three
ideals of a profession).
79 See generally DAVID KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1981). One must be wary of the motives-and remember that the NAACP advanced
ideas of equality that few white politicians were willing to follow. See Randall Kennedy, Race
Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1622, 1654 (1986). See also id. at 1655 ("The intricacies of behavior and motivation are
such that the dense factual predicate necessary for imposing persuasive judgments on judicial
conduct will almost always be incomplete, thereby forcing judgements almost always to be
provisional.").
80 See generally ELLIOTT RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. Louis, JULY 2, 1917 (1964).
Rudwick's volume presents the only comprehensive account of the riot currently available,
though it is badly in need of revision. While pioneering in its time, it focuses little attention on
the ideas motivating the African American resistance to violence in East St. Louis, which was
critical to the origins of the riot. Moreover, we need a much more subtle interpretation of the
factors of anti-union sentiments among the meat packing plants and metal factories as well.
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Carle has gotten us thinking in critical ways about class, race, and
legal change in ways that encourage a lot more attention. This, as Pro-
fessor Carle reminds us, is not just a question of history: these questions
will continue to perplex the legal profession.
We need a study, modeled on the work of labor historians, that understands the conflicting
racism and class discrimination of the Progressive era, as well as responses of the African
American community-and uses that understanding to depict the evolution of violence against
the African American community, its response, the riot, and the aftermath. See ERIC ARNESEN,
BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR: BLACK RAILROAD WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
(2001); RICK HALPERN, DOWN ON THE KILLING FLOOR: BLACK AND WHITE WORKERS IN CHI-
CAGO'S PACKINGHOUSES, 1904-54 (1997). In short, we need a comprehensive picture of the
human actors on all sides of the conflict and how they interacted.
The crucible of riot led social scientists and politicians to advance interpretations of the riot.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIYI'EE AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE
THE EAST ST. LOUIS RIOTS, 114 H.D. 1231 (65th Congress, 1918) (assigning blame to lax law
enforcement, corrupt city politics, and anti-union actions by local employers). Yet we need to
interpret those competing narratives to tease out the interplay of law, race, and class in leading
to the breakdown of law in July 1917-and how that riot led both African Americans and
whites to react differently in future conflicts.
2003]

